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Abstract of paper:   
If legal institutions endorse LSAT scores and UGPAs as accurate assessments of ability, 
to what extent does “ability” influence wages in the legal job market? Do average salaries 
of graduates of top schools justify these schools’ lofty admittance standards? Earning a 
law degree does not automatically grant its holder the right to practice law; in fact, it is 
essentially a prerequisite for consideration by the professional organization that regulates 
the law profession in any given jurisdiction. Upon earning a law degree, aspirants must 
slay yet another mighty dragon, the bar exam. Given that certain law schools require 
excellent LSAT scores and GPAs, does graduation from these schools precede high bar 
passage rates? Using empirical evidence containing average LSAT scores, UGPAs, 
starting salaries, and bar passage rates, this study uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
to evaluate relative efficiency levels across 35 law schools in the Pacific West and 
Mountain zones, including the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Utah, Arizona, 
Colorado, and Montana.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An axiom among aspiring law school students is that getting into a top law school 
means receiving not only a top-quality education, but also an opportunity for a top-paying 
job. And why should they think otherwise? The average starting salary of a Harvard Law 
graduate in 2006 lie north of $125,000, while starting salaries for Stanford and USC 
averaged out at $125,000 and $135,000-plus. In some cities, fully loaded compensation 
for new law graduates in large firms can lie in the range of $180,000 to $200,000 (Bower, 
2007). Many professionals in the law community claim that “names open doors,” viewing 
the reputation of the law school one attends as a key to a world of lucrative professional 
opportunities.  
However, getting into a great law school is far from easy and arguably more than 
just difficult. The fact is that all of the top institutions hold extremely high standards for 
admission, requiring an applicant to not only have a stellar undergraduate performance, 
but to score very competitively on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). The LSAT 
is a timed standardized test required for admission to all American Bar Association- 
(ABA) approved law schools, and many non-ABA-approved law schools. It provides a 
standard measure of acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills that law schools use to 
measure an applicant’s current abilities as well as to ascertain their potential performance 
in law school. A common practice for law schools is to use student’s LSAT scores and 
undergraduate grade point averages (UGPAs) in a weighted sum to generate an admission 
index.  
Indeed, a high undergraduate UGPA may indicate a given applicant’s ability to win 
the war, so to speak, but the LSAT tests for the applicant’s alacrity on the field of battle. 
If legal institutions endorse LSAT scores and UGPAs as accurate assessments of ability, 
to what extent does “ability” influence wages in the legal job market? Do average salaries 
of graduates of top schools justify these schools’ lofty admittance standards? Earning a 
law degree does not automatically grant its holder the right to practice law; in fact, it is 
essentially a prerequisite for consideration by the professional organization that regulates 
the law profession in any given jurisdiction. Upon earning a law degree, aspirants must 
slay yet another mighty dragon, the bar exam. Given that certain law schools require 
excellent LSAT scores and GPAs, does graduation from these schools precede high bar 
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passage rates? Using empirical evidence containing average LSAT scores, UGPAs, 
starting salaries, and bar passage rates, I will implement Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to evaluate relative efficiency levels across 35 law schools in the Pacific West and 
Mountain zones, including the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Utah, Arizona, 
Colorado, and Montana.1  
An interesting preface to an inquiry into law school performance, given the input 
criteria selected for this study, is the general notion of predictive validity. Within the 
thicket of social sciences, a branch of psychology particularly interested in measuring 
predictive validity is the field of psychometrics.2 In the interest of theory and technique, 
psychometricians attempt to construct instruments and procedures for educational and 
psychological measurement. The Stanford-Binet IQ test, originally developed by the 
French psychologist Alfred Binet, represents a well-known outcome of such efforts. 
Though the IQ test has achieved household name popularity, the test has come under fire 
or deemed inadequate for several reasons, including environmental discrepancies and 
individualistic factors. Regardless, the IQ test has remained a widely regarded yardstick 
of intelligence assessment.   
Similarly, there have been concerns that the LSAT may be inaccurate or not fully 
representative of a given subject’s academic potential, particularly with a heterogeneous 
applicant pool (Fagan, 2002). A prevalent criticism is that the LSAT merely tests 
someone’s ability to take a test under tightly girded time constraints. Yet, despite the 
negative press, all ABA-approved law schools continue to utilize the LSAT as a key 
component in their respective admissions processes. Normatively speaking, the 
touchstone for a given standardized test score must be its ability to consistently predict 
some important future outcome; the word “standardized” most certainly implies 
consistency. As well, an ideal university admissions process should be one comprised of 
a rigorous meritocratic system, selecting only the most auspicious students, with no 
regard for demographics or socio-economic background. While the LSAT’s accuracy 
may be questionable, the bottom line is that most law schools trust the predictive validity 
                                                 
1
 The central Pacific Ocean area, i.e. Hawaii has been omitted for simplification purposes.  
2
 “The branch of psychology that deals with the design, administration, and interpretation of 
quantitative tests for the measurement of psychological variables such as intelligence, aptitude, 
and personality traits. Also called psychometry” (Psychometrics, n.d.) 
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of the test, viewing LSAT scores as indicative of future academic success and an 
admitted student’s ability to contribute to institutional prestige.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A large amount of literature exists which examines academic performance and 
academic success prediction. In 1995, John W. Young contributed a report to the 
“Educational and Psychological Measurement” bimonthly journal entitled, “A 
Comparison of Two Adjustment Methods for Improving the Prediction of Law School 
Grades.” Young (1995) wrote, “[c]riticisms about the effectiveness of preadmission 
measures generally focus only on the limitations of the predictors” (p.559). As the title 
suggests, Young (1995) sought to detect any changes in the predictive validity of the 
LSAT on law school performance when the criterion was changed from first-year grade 
point average (GPA) to the cumulative GPA (1995). He suggested that many predictive 
validity studies were inherently limited due their reliance on first year GPA as the 
criterion. Institutional studies favored first year GPAs because they are easy to obtain and 
are a well-defined criterion (1995). Further, cumulative GPAs contain “noise” generated 
by unique grade distributions of the varying combinations of courses taken by students 
(1995).  
Young (1995) viewed the first-year GPA criterion as “neither a sufficient nor [an] 
adequate measure of a student’s overall achievement” and suggested that a cumulative 
GPA would offer more advantages (1995, p.559). Thus, he proposed using a previously 
validated grade adjustment method to correct for the interruptive nature of the cumulative 
GPA. Young (1995) was the first to use his method in a study on post-graduate 
performance.  
Young (1995) obtained data from four accredited U.S. law schools, choosing one 
school from the West (School A), one from the South (School B), and two from the 
Northeast (C and D, respectively).  Three of the schools were public and one private. 
Using item response theory (IRT) and the (statistical) general linear model (GLM), 
Young (1995) generated figures that equated grades from different course (using a rating 
scale) and displayed optimizing characteristics of the least squares approach.  
5
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The results of Young’s grade adjustment methods were minor, indicating that the 
correlation of predictive validity of the LSAT was only slightly improved (1995). Young 
(1995) attributed the low improvement to the similarity of the law courses taken by the 
students. In other words, previous efforts using the same adjustment methods yielded 
greater results because of the greater variation in chosen courses among undergrad 
students. In law school, everyone essentially takes the same courses. Thus, correlation 
improvements based on course differences “would likely have little impact in changing 
the relative rankings of students” (Young, 1995, p.570). School D (from the Northeast) 
displayed an 83 percent greater correlation between LSAT and future performance than 
the other three schools. Young (1995) explained this disparity emphasizing that School D 
had a significantly higher variation of LSAT scores than the other three schools.  
 
Note on Capital 
 
There exists an interesting relationship between Young’s research and my 
forthcoming efficiency analysis. Young’s report examines the predictive validity and 
correlation of standardized testing (LSAT) and UGPA with law school success. In my 
analysis of law schools, I will utilize the same “predictors” or academic capital 
measurements as Young; however, the criteria by which the predictors or “inputs” are 
measured render my project unique. The essence of the project will be in analyzing how 
law schools handle admitted individuals’ qualifications (given the specific criteria), and 
how an efficient or inefficient cultivation of student talents serves these individuals in the 
professional job market. Law school graduates fresh onto the legal job scene are 
presumably endowed with high levels of job search-type as well as industry-specific 
human capital; the respective school they attend no doubt cultivates the former while 
signaling the latter (to varying degrees). Both the job search and industry-specific skill 
sets are likely to render constituents suitable for significant measures of success in the 
types of professional work environments to which they aspire. For the purposes of this 
analysis, it is assumed that the graduates of the sample law schools harbor the type of 
forward-trajectory mindset that not only allows them to thrive professionally, but to 
discourage questions about sub-par individual performance effects on labor market 
outcomes. Regarding the law schools, it is unlikely that the results of this analysis will 
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reveal the extent to which a given school’s reputation capital influences a law school 
graduate’s job prospects; however, it is doubtful that a given school’s reputation has no 
bearing on an employment outcome.   
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The relationship between efficiency and production is a crucial aspect of 
performance in an industry. The survival of an entrant to a given industry often depends 
on that decision-making unit’s (DMU’s) ability to achieve a competitive output while 
operating at an efficient level of production. M.J. Farrell (1957) viewed the relationship 
between efficiency and production as critical to both economic theory and economic 
policy, stating, “if economic planning is to concern itself with particular industries, it is 
important to know how far a given industry can be expected to increase its output by 
simply increasing its efficiency, without absorbing further resources” (p.11).  
For the purpose of taking efficiency measurements, Farrell (1957) introduced the 
idea of measuring relative technical efficiency by establishing benchmark firms (efficient 
DMUs in the industry), and then comparing inefficient firms to them. Charnes, Cooper, 
and Rhodes (1978) expanded Farrell’s idea by introducing a linear programming method 
called data envelopment analysis (DEA).  
 
Advantages of DEA 
 
Since its inception, DEA has become a popular management tool. Among the 
various approaches to measuring productivity and efficiency, DEA offers some 
advantages. For example, unlike multiple regression analysis, DEA does not require the 
estimation of a production function. As well, DEA allows for the evaluation of the 
efficiency of a number of producers. Statistical approaches rely on a comparison of 
inefficient producers to some average hypothetical producer. The extreme point 
technique of DEA, however, compares inefficient firms to actual “best” firms while 
accounting for differing input combinations or “technologies”.  
Inherent in the relative measurement approach of DEA is a unique flexibility. DEA 
provides an adaptable approach to assessing performance in cases where maximizing 
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profit or revenue is not the main goal. For example, the behavior of public sector DMU’s, 
where empire-building3 tendencies are likely present (Rosen & Gayer, 2008), might not 
be conducive to a performance measurement based on profit or revenue. To be sure, the 
flexibility of DEA is critical to the endeavor of measuring law school efficiency based on 
starting salary and bar passage criterions. 
 
Data Requirements 
 
An important assumption behind DEA is that if a given firm, say DMU1, can 
produce ya units of output using xa inputs, then other DMU’s using the same combination 
and intensity of inputs should be capable of the same feat. Likewise, if DMU2 can 
produce yb units of output using xb inputs, then other DMU’s using the same input 
combination should be capable of similar production. Combinations of DMU1, DMU2, 
(and any other efficient producers), form virtual or composite producers to which actual 
DMUs are compared. If an actual DMU does not fare well compared to its most relevant 
virtual producer (e.g., uses more inputs to produce the same output as the virtual 
producer), then the actual producer is inefficient.  
The software used in this study, “OnFront,” authored by Färe & Grosskopf (2000) 
and published by the EMQ Corporation, identifies benchmark observations and 
constructs a “best practice frontier” to which other observations are compared (p.2). In 
this paper, the outputs of law schools are the focus, meaning that the best practice frontier 
will be the output set which is constructed using observations of outputs, given inputs. 
Färe & Grosskopf (2000) define the frontier as being constructed using any number 
of inputs (x) and outputs (y): 
 (N)  Different types of inputs (expressed individually):         Nnxn ,...,1, =  
 (M) Different types of outputs (expressed individually):     Mmym ,...,1, =  
                                                 
3
 William A. Niskanen Jr. suggested that power and status are positively correlated with the size of a 
bureaucrat’s budget and that the bureaucrat’s objective is to maximize his or her budget, resulting in 
oversupply of service. 
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Accordingly, the analysis of law school efficiency will only require the observation 
of two different measurable outputs; 
1y  (first time taker bar passage rate) 
2y (average starting salary). 
Continuing with the notation used by Färe & Grosskopf (2000), the following 
expression defines the number of DMU’s observed; 
.,...,1 Kk =  
This means that there are K different law schools being observed. Observations in 
the study will include information on all inputs and outputs, conveniently expressed as 
),...,( 1 kNkk xxx =      and     ),...,( 1 kMkk yyy = . 
In summary, the output possibilities set can be expressed as  
}.,...,1,0
,,...,1,
,,...,1,
:),...,{(),|(
1
1
1
Kkz
Nnyxz
Mmyyz
yySCxP
k
K
k
nknk
K
k
mkmk
M
=≥
=≤
=≥
=
∑
∑
=
=
 
Best Practice Technology 
There are three ways to express best practice technology: 
• Input Requirement Set L(y) that shows all the combinations of     inputs that can 
be used to produce the output vector y, 
• Output Requirement Set P(x) which shows all the combinations of outputs that 
can be produced by the input vector x. 
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• Graph GR which shows the combinations of inputs x and outputs y that are 
technically feasible. 
(Färe & Grosskopf, 2000, p.3) 
As stated previously, the outputs used in this study are first-time taker bar pass rates 
and first-year average starting salaries of graduates from 35 law schools in Pacific West 
and Mountain zones of the U.S. The inputs used are UGPA and average LSAT scores of 
students entering these institutions. Given that this study relies on inputs that function on 
the consumer preference concept of “non-satiation” (i.e., students should strive to achieve 
excellent marks), the goal here is not to seek out substitutes or lower degrees of inputs 
but to increase measured outputs given “high” or in this case, success-driven inputs. To 
focus on squeezing a high salary and a good shot at passing a state bar exam through 
substandard undergraduate grades and a mediocre LSAT score would simply be an 
exercise in futility. However, in the event that this study yields worthy or reliable results, 
a prospective law student with sub-par undergraduate performance could “shop around” 
for an institution that scored well and that endorses an admissions requirement feasible 
for that student.  
The bottom line is that output-based 
efficiency measurements are far more 
appropriate when dealing with the inputs 
and outputs used in this study. Table 1, 
(right) presents an example output set. 
Using the data in Table 1, the best practice technology may be expressed as 
}0,,
111
121
112
:),{(),|1(
2
1
21
≥
≤⋅+⋅+⋅
≥⋅+⋅+⋅
≥⋅+⋅+⋅
=
CBA
CBA
CBA
CBA
zzz
xzzz
yzzz
yzzz
yySCP
 
 Table 1.  
School       
(DMU) 
Input          
x 
Output 1          
y1 
Output 2      
y2 
A 1 2 1 
B 1 1 2 
C 1 1 1 
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   Figure 1 
The idea is not to decrease inputs, but to expand outputs; therefore, the study of law 
school efficiency here uses Farrell-type output efficiency measurement.  
The Farrell Output-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency is expressed as 
follows: 
)}.,|(:max{),|,(0 SCxPySCyxF ∈= θθ  
Linear Programming 
Analyzing the efficiency of K producers is then a set of N linear programming 
problems. The OnFront software uses the linear programming technique introduced by 
Charnes et al (1978) to find the best virtual producer. The linear programming problem to 
be solved in school C in Table 1 is 
}0,,
1111
1121
1112
..
max),|,1,1,1(),|,(
≥
≤⋅+⋅+⋅
≥⋅+⋅+⋅
≥⋅+⋅+⋅
=
CBA
CBA
CBA
CBA
oo
zzz
zzz
zzz
zzz
ts
SCFSCyxF
θ
θ
θ
 
The maximum value of θ is the producer's 
efficiency. The z values create the inefficient 
DMU’s distance from the appropriate actual 
DMU(s) to which it is compared. Solving the 
above inequalities for optimal values of the z’s 
and θ. by first equating the observed DMU to 
zero, then substituting appropriate z values, results 
in the Farrell-type output efficiency level for the 
particular observation. Any value θ > 1, as in the 
case with observation C in Figure 1, indicates an 
inefficient level of output; θ = 1 is efficient, i.e., the school lies on the best practice 
frontier. 
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   Figure 2 
 
A 
Output Slack 
Given the radial symmetry of the best 
practice frontier, there is a possibility for DMUs 
to have what is called “output slack” (Färe & 
Grosskopf, 2000, p.24). What this amounts to is 
that firms may be technically efficient (DEA score 
of 1) and lie on the best practice frontier, yet there 
is room to increase one type of output using the 
same combination of inputs. A visual 
representation of this idea is observed in Figure 2. 
Point ‘A’ lies on the best practice frontier but 
should be capable of increasing its output of y1. As mentioned earlier, DMUs in a sample 
are all compared to actual best DMUs, represented in Figure 2 by points 1 and 2. In 
addition to providing Farrell output efficiency scores, the OnFront software may also 
generate “dual values” and “z-variables.” The duals may indicate that a particular DMU 
contains output slack, while the z-variables represent a given DMU’s comparison values, 
which in turn may be used to calculate said slack.  
 
According to Fare and Grosskopf (2000), “[t]here is Slack in output my  for firm k’ if  
,),|,(
1
''
'∑
=
⋅>
K
k
kk
omkkmk SCyxFyyz  
 
is true for some solution value for Kkzk ,...,1, = ” (p.25). In the case of measuring law 
school efficiency in the manner presented in this study, a law school with some amount 
of output slack would mean that either its LSAT averages or UGPAs could theoretically 
be decreased while maintaining the established salary and bar passage output.  
Virtually every quantitative analysis of data involves some sort of graphical 
analysis. However, under the circumstances of this study, a two-dimensional graphical 
representation of DEA results is inappropriate because the data used requires four-
dimension.  
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In summary, the basic features of the data in this study are: 
• (x1) input 1 – average Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores of 
entering students. 
• (x2) input 2 – average undergrad grade point averages (UGPA) of entering 
students. 
• (y1) output 1 – average starting salaries of law school graduates. 
• (y2) output 2 – first-time taker state bar exam passage rates of graduates. 
• )},|(:max{),|,(0 SCxPySCyxF ∈= θθ  Farrell Output-Oriented Measure 
of Technical Efficiency 
• Sample – data on 35 U.S. law schools from the Pacific West and Mountain 
zones used for study. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Data used in this study, including LSAT scores, UGPAs, first-time taker bar 
passage rates, career placement information, and average starting salaries, is 
representative of the 2006 academic year and was obtained from “The Princeton Review” 
web site. The Princeton Review (2007), similar to Kaplan, Inc., has long been associated 
with student transition into higher education, including graduate, medical, business, and 
law schools. The Princeton review has divisions in test preparation (SAT, ACT, GMAT, 
MCAT, LSAT, GRE, USMLE), K-12 programs, and admissions services. Many college 
admissions offices use Princeton Review resources to introduce their schools to interested 
students and augment their applicant pool (Princeton, 2007). The National Association 
for College Admission Counseling (NCAC), an organization of more than 9,800 
professionals from around the world, endorses The Princeton Review as an ethical and 
socially responsible service for students in the transition process (National, 2007).  
As discussed earlier, DEA requires both input and output quantities. Standard 
microeconomic theory uses labor and capital as production inputs. This study uses LSAT 
scores and UGPAs of entering law school students as proxies for the standard input 
measures. Conveniently, no prior calculations were required in preparing input data for 
use in the OnFront software. The output measures, which include first-time taker bar 
13
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passage rates, average starting salaries, and public interest/government sector practice, 
also required no additional preparation. However, the output measures do betoken a 
particular technical caveat. The upper-bound nature of the bar passage rates as well as the 
individual schools’ percentages of public interest- and government sector-bound 
graduates should be addressed. While some graduating classes do actually “achieve” a 
100 percent bar passage rate, the majority do not. In 2006 (the data year for this study), 3 
out of 181 ABA-approved law schools (1.6 percent) achieved the 100 percent status 
(Princeton, 2007). None of the schools observed in this study accomplished 100 percent 
passage. 
         Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the input and output data based on the 
original bar passage and average salary output criterions. An item to note is the higher 
mean LSAT and UGPA of public versus private schools and the perhaps correlative 
higher average bar pass rates and first year salaries. Another item to note is the range of 
values in Table 2. Private schools posses a greater range of LSAT, UGPA, and bar pass 
values compared to public schools. One possible explanation might be a higher 
selectivity of private schools than that of public schools, i.e., admissions criteria that 
weigh some factors, other than LSAT and UGPA values, higher than the average public 
school admissions criteria. The 2006 acceptance rate for the private schools in this study 
was 33.6 percent; for public schools, the acceptance rate was 27.7 percent.  
If we are to give credence to the widely held belief that private schools are “highly 
selective” or “tough to get into,” the higher acceptance rate coupled with the broader 
range of acceptable LSAT and UGPA figures of this study, indicates that there must be 
private institutions that value non-LSAT/UGPA acceptance criteria more than some 
public schools. Interestingly, a higher selectivity characteristic generally makes a positive 
statement about an institution, often adding to a given school’s highly valued prestige and 
boosting its reputation capital. Average starting salary ranges between public and private 
schools remain similar, though public schools have a higher average starting salary than 
private schools.  
Law school graduates entering public interest or government sector areas of law 
practice do so with the knowledge that these areas are generally much lower paying than 
private or business sector practices. In fact, many schools offer incentive programs that 
facilitate “loan forgiveness” in exchange for some degree of commitment to the public 
14
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sector. In consideration of these pay disparities, an additional “output” measure  
representing percentages of law school graduates entering public interest or government 
law employment is factored into the analysis and a summary of the individual 
percentages is depicted in Table 3. The intention here is not to change the direction of the 
study, nor abandon the original research question, but simply to add an interesting 
dimension to the results, and hopefully augment any possible relationships between 
LSAT scores, UGPAs, and legal job market prospects.  
 
DEA RESULTS 
 
As previously mentioned, the most appropriate DEA approach for this study is the 
Farrell-type output efficiency computation. Therefore, the “best practice” DMUs will be 
those that receive a score of 1=θ . DMUs with scores 1>θ  are said to “inefficient.” A 
simple calculation of 1−θ  will give the percent inefficiency of a given DMU. Table 5 
shows the efficiency score data, comparing private school performance to public school  
performance using starting salaries and first-time taker bar passage rates as outputs 
(left column) as well as public interest/government percentages and first year starting 
salaries as outputs (right column).  
First, public schools show a better average efficiency score than private schools. 
One thing to note is that many California “state” law schools reside in nearby business 
and commerce hotbeds, where many large private firms flourish, and regularly recruit at 
these schools. The high salaries of graduates of some of these state schools no doubt 
improve the overall DEA performance of public schools overall. Another item to note is 
the efficiency range of private schools with salary and bar passage as outputs. Table 5 
shows that the public efficiency maximum is 0.78 points below (i.e., better than) the 
private efficiency score. One possible explanation for this relatively wide efficiency 
range is the private schools’ broad range of acceptable LSAT and UGPA figures. 
Referring back to Table 2, private schools show an LSAT score range of 151–170, and a 
UGPA range of 3.12–3.83, compared to the public school LSAT score range of 152–166, 
and UGPA range of 3.32–3.75. Regarding outputs, private schools show a greater range 
in both average starting salaries and bar passage rates. The minimum bar passage rate for 
private schools (35 percent) is 30 percent lower than the public school minimum. Also, 
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noteworthy is the private school range of bar passage rates. While public schools have a 
range of 30 percentage points, private schools show a range of 59 percentage points. 
In August 2005, the American Bar Association placed two California law schools 
on a two-year probationary period due to poor bar passage rates. Whittier Law School, 
located in Costa Mesa and San Francisco-based Golden Gate School of Law (both private 
institutions) continue to display low bar passage achievements as indicated by the 2006 
data observed in this study. Given that these schools have significantly lower LSAT and 
UGPA requirements, there is some indication that LSAT and UGPA endowment have an 
influence on subsequent bar passage figures.    
Viewing Table 5 again, the mean efficiency scores of public and private schools as 
computed using public interest/government practice percentages and starting salaries as 
outputs, are virtually identical. Given the salary/bar output criteria, public schools display 
a wider range of efficiency scores than do private schools; immediately noticeable is the 
significantly higher (less efficient) public school maximum. As determined in Table 6 
(below), public schools fill a higher percentage of public interest and government sector 
jobs than do private schools, which places downward pressure on average starting 
salaries, thus “weakening” the efficiency score of public schools.  
Important to note here is that while 
public interest and government sector 
percentages do tend to pull down average 
starting salaries, the share of graduates 
pursuing these areas comprise a minority. In 
fact, a sweeping majority of law school 
graduates seeks out private or business 
sector positions; other “less favored” fields 
include academia and judicial clerkships. 
Whether public schools encourage students 
interested in public sector work more so 
than private schools is not immediately 
evident. In any event, Table 2 shows that the 
public school mean starting salary is 
significantly higher than the private school mean.  
Table 6. Percent of Graduates Entering                
Public Interest/Gov. Practice 
Mean    
  
         Public  18  
  
         Private 15.65  
  
         All  16.86  
  
st. dev    
  
         Public  5.72  
  
         Private 5.59  
  
         All  5.7  
  
Min    
  
         Public  9  
  
         Private 5  
  
         All  5  
  
Max    
  
         Public  31  
  
         Private 25  
  
         All   31   
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Table’s 3 provides statistics for “efficient” law schools with Farrell output 
efficiency scores of 1 to 1.1 and Table 4 depicts “inefficient” schools with efficiency 
scores of 1.2 and above4. Table 3 reveals that efficient private and public LSAT scores, 
UGPAs, starting salaries, and bar passage rates closely resemble one another with only 
slight deviations. Given the arbitrary efficient score range, efficient public schools show a 
lower LSAT score average but slightly higher UGPA figure than private schools, 
indicating that a equally efficient DEA score was achieved with slightly “less” of the 
LSAT  input, but slightly more of the UGPA input. Concerning outputs, private schools 
show both a higher mean bar passage rate as well as higher mean starting salaries, which 
signals once more that LSAT scores perhaps influence bar passage rates. Table 4 shows 
that “inefficient” public schools have a higher LSAT average and UGPA figure than 
private schools, though private schools. While private and public average starting salaries 
are virtually identical, the corresponding bar passage rates are not. Considering that 
inefficient private schools display lower LSAT, UGPA, and bar passage rates than public 
schools in the inefficient category, the notion that LSAT scores and UGPAs influence bar 
passage is once again raised.  
As previously mentioned, “output slack” can occur when a particular DMU is 
technically efficient (DEA score of 1) yet there is room to increase one type of output 
using the same combination of inputs. In this analysis for example, Lewis and Clark Law 
School shows in its corresponding duals value that it contains slack due to its LSAT (x1) 
input figure. In the analysis, Lewis and Clark’s comparison schools are Stanford (average 
LSAT of 170) and University of New Mexico (average LSAT of 155). The corresponding 
z-variables representing this comparison relationship are 0.33 (Stanford) and 0.6 (New 
Mexico) which essentially means that Lewis and Clark is being compared to New 
Mexico more so it is being compared to Stanford. The Output slack calculation is as 
follows: 
1.149)6.0(155)033(.170 =+  
Lewis and Clark’s LSAT average is 160, so the output slack is (160-149.1) = 10.9 
points. In other words, the average LSAT score for Lewis and Clark could technically be 
                                                 
4
 Truly efficient firms are those with a DEA score value of 1. For the purposes of analysis, an arbitrary 
range of efficiency and inefficiency has been chosen in order to provide an adequate sample in which to 
derive additional descriptive statistics.  
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approximately 149, given Lewis and Clark’s average starting salaries and first time taker 
bar passage rates. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
To revisit the question posed at the beginning; Do high LSAT scores precede high 
bar passage rates? According to the above results, LSAT scores may affect bar passage 
rates. Using dual values and z-variables to compute the output slack of relevant DMUs, it 
was revealed that certain average starting salaries should technically be feasible given a 
“smaller” input value, or LSAT score. When viewing Table 3, DMUs in a relatively high 
efficiency range display a correlation between high LSAT scores/ UGPAs and high bar 
passage achievements. At the upper end of the spectrum, these good scores translate into 
high starting salaries. However, “inefficient” private schools show a broader LSAT range 
and lower minimum than public schools but maintain a higher average salary than 
“inefficient” public schools. Do average starting salaries of top school graduates justify 
these schools aggressive LSAT and UGPA admissions standards? Perhaps this is a 
subjective question. This DEA project indicates that LSAT scores influence both starting 
salary and bar passage rates in the efficiency range of 1 to 1.1, and only affect the bar 
passage rates in the 1.2 and above range.  
 
U.S. News Law School Rankings 
 
Law schools generate an admission index using LSAT and UGPA in order to 
“rank” applications and thus expedite the admission process. It is likely that admitted 
students experience (to varying degrees) an intensified version of such a meritocratic 
system within the walls of the institution. However, are law schools ardent proponents of 
law school ranking systems, such as the U.S. News and World Report’s “Best Graduate 
Schools”? On the surface, law schools show an aversion to the rankings or “lists.” In 
1997, 150 law school deans signed a joint letter denouncing the U.S. News rankings; the 
following year, the Association for American Law Schools commissioned a study calling 
the validity of the publication’s rankings into question. The much-maligned yet widely 
read list has no doubt stirred up a lot of controversy, yet is influences “decisions that are 
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central to the academic enterprise – decisions about resources allocation, faculty hiring, 
curriculum, and so on” (Grossman, 2004, para.48).  
Regardless of any dissension they engender, the U.S. News rankings do tend to 
represent some measure of validity, i.e., they serve as an impetus for concrete decisions 
made by law schools, and they affect decisions of applicants (where to apply, matriculate, 
or transfer). How do the DEA output efficiency scores obtained in my study compare to 
U.S. News law school rankings? Twenty-three of the thirty-five law schools observed in 
this study placed in the “Top 100 Law Schools” list. Figure 3, shown below, clearly 
depicts a significant correlation between the two measures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What, if anything, does the s the relationship between DEA output efficiency 
scores (using the selected input/output criteria) and the U.S. News rankings reveal? There 
are two important considerations to put forth. First, the DEA study revealed that in the 
case of “inefficient” privates schools (Table 4), LSAT scores and UGPA less affect the 
starting salary figure. Second, the U.S. News list places significant emphasis (40 percent) 
on law school reputation. Ceteris paribus, there are likely some factors other than the 
merit of the individual(s) that enables the pool of observed private schools to maintain an 
average starting salary higher than that of “inefficient” public schools. The correlation 
between the two scores may reveal (and confirm the intuition) that a school’s reputation 
plays a key role in the placement of a graduate, and to some extent, the graduates starting 
salary.   
 
 Figure 3. U.S. News Rank / DEA Output Efficiency Scores 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Input and Output Quantities (2006) 
  
  
BAR (y1) SALARY (y2) LSAT (x1) UGPA (x2) 
Mean 
 
     
         Public  
 
80.89 74971 160 3.5 
         Private 
 
69.55 69517 158 3.357 
         All 
 
76.59 72902 159 3.447 
st. dev 
 
     
         Public  
 
8.1 24698.26 4 0.133 
         Private 
 
17.99 24260.33 5 0.210 
         All 
 
13.67 24244.84 5 0.177 
Min (25th percentile) 
 
     
         Public  
 
65 41063 152 3.32 
         Private 
 
35 50000 151 3.12 
         All 
 
35 41063 151 3.12 
Max (75th percentile) 
 
     
         Public  
 
95 125000 166 3.75 
         Private 
 
94 135000 170 3.83 
         All 
  
95 135000 170 3.83 
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Table 3. Input and Output Quantities of Efficient DMUs: DEA Scores [1, 1.10] 
 
  
  
BAR (y1) SALARY (y2) LSAT (x1) UGPA (x2) 
Mean       
         Public   88 84209 162 3.59 
         Private  90 89094 164 3.56 
         All  88 85541 163 3.58 
st. dev       
         Public   4.34 30077.17 3.65 0.12 
         Private  5.86 42721.91 6.51 0.31 
         All  4.55 31677.81 4.27 0.17 
Min (25th percentile)       
         Public   81 48818 155 3.34 
         Private  83 50500 157 3.23 
         All  81 48818 155 3.23 
Max (75th percentile)       
         Public   95 125000 166 3.75 
         Private  94 135000 170 3.83 
         All   95 135000 170 3.83 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
BAR (y1) SALARY (y2) LSAT (x1) UGPA (x2) 
Mean       
         Public   72 66289 159 3.38 
         Private  56 66938 156 3.26 
        All  60 66765 157 3.29 
st. dev       
         Public   4.99 15391 2.52 0.06 
         Private  14.81 12058 3.45 0.15 
        All  14.59 12438 3.36 0.14 
Min (25th percentile)       
         Public   65 48816 155 3.32 
         Private  35 50000 151 3.00 
        All  35 48816 151 3.00 
Max (75th percentile)       
         Public   76 83000 161 3.44 
         Private  74 86451 161 3.50 
        All   76 86451 161 3.50 
 
Table 4. Input and Output Quantities of Inefficient DMUs: DEA Scores [1.25, ∞) 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Farrell-type Output Efficiency Scores (summary) 
 
 
 
Fo(x, y | C,S)                     
SALARY (y1)/ BAR (y2) 
             Fo(x, y | C,S)                                                              
PUB./GOV. (y1) / SALARY (y2) 
Mean 
 
    
         Public  
 
1.1350 1.2505   
Private 
 
1.3547 1.2582   
         All 
 
1.2417 1.2543   
st. dev 
 
    
         Public  
 
0.8979 0.2547   
        Private 
 
0.3001 0.1509   
         All 
 
0.2425 0.2076   
Min (25th 
percentile)      
         Public  
 
1.0000 1.0000 
  
        Private 
 
1.0000 1.0000 
  
         All 
 
1.0000 1.0000 
  
Max (75th 
percentile)      
         Public  
 
1.3000 1.9200 
  
        Private 
 
2.0800 1.4600 
  
         All 
  
2.0800 1.9200 
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